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CONTEMPORARY PROSECUTIONS OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA CRIMES: AN 
ARGUMENT AGAINST RETROACTIVE 





Racial tensions in the South and especially those in Mississippi boiled 
over in the summer of 1964, partly as a result of the convergence of the 
Freedom Summer volunteers on the state and the imminent passage of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  One newspaper account described Mississippi as 
a “besieged fortress” where “[c]rosses were burned in 64 of the state’s 82 
counties the night of April 24.”2  Pervasive racism also infiltrated many 
levels of state government, which included both non-violent, silent support 
and violent, public support of racial segregation in public schools and 
public accommodations.3  Partially as a response to the perceived 
equalization of the races, the Ku Klux Klan received significant support not 
just from ordinary citizens, but also from sympathizers entrenched within 
certain state and local law enforcement agencies.  These embedded Klan 
sympathizers “provided both protection against prosecution and the 
appearance that Klan activities—to some extent—were conducted under 
color of state law.”4
In the six months prior to May 26, 1964, five African Americans were 
reported as murdered in a five-county radius in the southern corner of 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.S. Indiana University, 
2003. 
1 Racial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1964, at E1.  The Freedom Summer was an 
organized effort by several Civil Rights groups “in which 1,000 volunteers, white and Negro, 
were to move into the state to promote Negro voter-registration, education and community 
work.”  Id. 
2 Claude Sitton, Mississippi Is Gripped by Fear of Violence in Civil Rights Drive, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 1964, at 1. 
3 Killen v. State, 958 So. 2d 172, 174 (Miss. 2007). 
4 Id. at 175. 
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Mississippi.5  Less than one month later, three Freedom Summer 
volunteers—Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James E. 
Cheney—were reported missing in what was to become perhaps the most 
famous of the Civil Rights Era murders, the “Mississippi Burning” case.6  
Among the racially motivated murders that summer were the May 2, 1964 
murders of Charles Moore and Henry Hezekiah Dee, a college student and 
local laborer, respectively.7  On the day of their murders, Moore and Dee 
were hitchhiking when a Volkswagen driven by James Ford Seale stopped 
to pick up the two boys.  A truck carrying three co-conspirators followed 
the Volkswagen to the national forest, where Seale and Charles Marcus 
Edwards, among others, tied Moore and Dee to trees and “beat them with 
‘bean poles,’ while [a co-conspirator] interrogated them . . . .”8  Moore and 
Dee eventually were tied to an engine block and dropped into the river, all 
while they were still alive.9
Six months later, Seale and Edwards were arrested and charged with 
killing Moore and Dee.
 
10  While in custody, Edwards confessed to taking 
Moore and Dee into the forest and whipping them, but nothing else, while 
Seale stated that he had done it but the police would have to “prove it.”11  
District Attorney Lenox Forman signaled his intention to bring the case 
before a grand jury.12  Forman’s actions all but ended the investigation, as a 
grand jury composed entirely of white residents of Mississippi would never 
bring an indictment against Edwards and Seale.13  In fact, the charges were 
dismissed on January 11, 1965, only two months after the original arrest.14
Even if the defendants were indicted and brought before a jury, it was 
unlikely that Seale and Edwards would have been convicted, given the 




5 Sitton, supra note 
  In fact, almost nothing about the murders 
2, at 1. 
6 Claude Sitton, 3 in Rights Drive Reported Missing, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1964, at 1; see 
Shaila Dewan, Pushing to Resolve Killings from the Civil Rights Era, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2007, at A11. 
7 2 Whites Seized in Negro Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1964, at 56. 
8 HARRY N. MACLEAN, THE PAST IS NEVER DEAD: THE TRIAL OF JAMES FORD SEALE AND 
MISSISSIPPI’S STRUGGLE FOR REDEMPTION 66–67 (2009). 
9 Id. at 67. 
10 2 Whites Seized in Negro Slayings, supra note 7. 
11 MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 38–39; see also Donna Ladd, James Ford Seale: A Trail of 
Documents Tells the Story, JACKSON FREE PRESS (Miss.), (Jan. 31, 2007), 
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/index.php/site/comments/james_ford_seale_a_trail_of_do
cuments_tells_the_story. 
12 MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 39. 
13 Id. 
14 Whites Freed in Slayings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1965, at 18; see also Ladd, supra note 
11. 
15 MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 37–38. 
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was mentioned for the next forty years, until a number of other Civil Rights 
Era crimes were brought to the public’s attention by a variety of local and 
national media.16  As a result of the renewed interest in prosecuting Civil 
Rights Era crimes, James Ford Seale was charged again in 2007 for the role 
he played in the deaths of Moore and Dee.  Charles Marcus Edwards, his 
co-conspirator, was given immunity by federal prosecutors in exchange for 
his testimony against Seale.17  The federal government indicted Seale under 
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) and (c) for two counts of kidnapping and one count of 
conspiracy to commit kidnapping.18  Seale ultimately was found guilty on 
all charges and sentenced to life in prison.19
The charges and conviction were predicated on the 1964 version of the 
statute, which identified kidnapping as a capital punishment eligible offense 
“if the kidnap[p]ed person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the 
verdict of the jury shall so recommend.”
 
20  In conjunction with the capital 
nature of the kidnapping statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 3281 provided an unlimited 
statute of limitations for all federal indictments of capital offenses.21  
However, in the intervening period of time between the crime and the 2007 
indictment, the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty for § 1201 
charges was unconstitutional.22  As a result of that ruling, Congress 
amended § 1201 to eliminate the death penalty as a potential punishment 
for a § 1201 conviction.23
The critical legal question to come from Seale’s 2007 conviction is 
whether Civil Rights Era kidnapping prosecutions should proceed under the 
unlimited statute of limitations offered by the 1964 version of § 1201 or 
under the 1972 amendment to § 1201.  This Comment addresses this issue 
beginning in Part II, which provides a more complete introduction to the 
procedural history of Seale’s conviction, including the Fifth Circuit’s 
 
 
16 Following the 1994 conviction of Byron De La Beckwith, the local and national 
media, including ABC’s program 20/20, sought to expose additional unsolved Civil Rights 
Era murders.  MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 50–51.  A sampling of cases that received the most 
attention include Ernest Avants’s conviction for his role in the death of Ben Chester White, 
Edgar Ray Killen’s conviction for his role in the death of three civil rights workers in 1964, 
and Bobby Frank Cherry’s conviction for his role in the deaths of four young girls killed in a 
Birmingham Church bombing.  Id. at 57–60. 
17 MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 102–03. 
18 United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 2008). 
19 United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 2009). 
20 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964). 
21 Id. at § 3281. 
22 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968) (holding “the death penalty 
provision of the Federal Kidnap[p]ing Act imposes an impermissible burden upon the 
exercise of a constitutional right”). 
23 Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, 
Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972). 
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appellate review of Seale’s conviction and the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
address the Fifth Circuit’s certified question.  Part II also provides a 
description of the changes to § 1201 since it was originally introduced in 
1932.  Part III is divided into three subparts: subpart A addresses the 
various tools a court may use to interpret the 1972 amendment to § 1201 
including the general rule regarding statutory retroactivity; subpart B 
addresses the potential for due process violations associated with the forty-
three year delay between the commission of the crime and the indictment; 
and subpart C addresses normative considerations for not applying the 1972 
amendment retroactively.  Finally, Part IV argues that the statute of 
limitations for Civil Rights Era kidnappings under § 1201 should be 
unlimited. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A full understanding of the background of Seale’s offense requires, 
first, an appreciation of the procedural complexity of the case, and second, a 
primer on how § 1201 has evolved in the last forty years.  This Part will 
address both of these issues individually. 
A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
Procedurally, United States v. Seale took a circuitous path through the 
federal courts, notwithstanding the fact that it took forty-three years to bring 
Seale to trial in the first place.24  As mentioned, Seale was initially 
convicted in the Southern District of Mississippi for two counts of 
kidnapping and one count of conspiracy to commit kidnapping.25  In an oral 
opinion on a defense motion to drop the charges based on an expired statute 
of limitations, the district court focused almost exclusively on United States 
v. Jackson in ruling that § 1201 was a capital crime for purposes of Seale’s 
criminal offense and, as such, the unlimited statute of limitations should 
apply.26  Seale’s attorneys appealed to the Fifth Circuit on seven different 
issues, including an assertion that the district court erred in denying the 
defense’s statute of limitations motion.  Seale’s motion asserted that as a 
result of the intervening 1972 amendment to § 1201, a five-year statute of 
limitations was applicable and had since expired.27
 
24 United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 2008). 
  A three-judge panel on 
the Fifth Circuit only considered Seale’s statute of limitations argument and 
unanimously voted to vacate the conviction by ruling “that the five-year 
limitations period made applicable to the federal kidnap[p]ing statute by the 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1036. 
27 See id. at 1034. 
2011] PROSECUTIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS ERA CRIMES 703 
1972 amendment applies to this case, where the alleged offense occurred in 
1964 and the indictment was issued in 2007.”28
In November 2008, a majority of the Fifth Circuit judges voted to 
rehear the case en banc over a vigorous dissent by Judge Smith.
 
29  The 
following June, the en banc Fifth Circuit split nine-to-nine on whether to 
affirm the conviction.30  In July, the Fifth Circuit sent a certified question to 
the Supreme Court, asking: “What statute of limitations applies to a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1201 for a kidnap[p]ing offense that 
occurred in 1964 but was not indicted until 2007?”31  In November 2009, 
the Supreme Court refused to answer the certified question over vigorous 
disagreement from both Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia.  Justice 
Stevens—writing for himself and Justice Scalia—recognized the 
importance of the certified question and reasoned that “[a] prompt answer 
from this Court [would] expedite the termination of this litigation and 
determine whether other similar cases may be prosecuted.”32  Justice 
Stevens also characterized the certified question as “narrow, debatable, and 
important.”33
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. § 1201 
  By refusing to answer the certified question, the Supreme 
Court effectively affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Seale’s 
statute of limitations motion.  Thus, the district court’s initial conviction of 
Seale and imposition of a life sentence were affirmed. 
Equally as important as understanding the procedural complexity of 
Seale is an understanding of the various changes 18 U.S.C. § 1201 has 
undergone since its adoption.  The statute was first enacted in 1932 as part 
of the Federal Kidnapping Act, which followed the outrage generated from 
the kidnapping of the Charles Lindbergh baby.34
 
28 Id. at 1045. 
  Prior to that high-profile 
29 United States v. Seale, 550 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2008).  In dissent, Judge Smith argued 
that “the government has not shown that the panel erred or that this case [merits] en banc 
consideration.”  He further placed the blame on the Department of Justice for the abrogation 
of justice.  Id. at 377. 
30 United States v. Seale, 570 F.3d 650, 650–51 (5th Cir. 2009). 
31 United States v. Seale, 577 F.3d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 2009). 
32 130 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
33 Id. 
34 The twenty-month-old son of Charles Lindbergh was kidnapped on March 1, 1932.  
Child Stolen in Evening, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1932, at 1.  What is today 18 U.S.C. § 1201 
was for a period of time known simply as the Lindbergh Law.  See generally New Lindbergh 
Law is Invoked in Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1932, at 15. 
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case, kidnapping was only punishable under state law.35  Thus, § 1201 
created a new federal offense for kidnapping that crossed state lines.36
The first major change to § 1201 was made in 1972 as a response to 
both United States v. Jackson
 
37 and Furman v. Georgia.38  Jackson 
invalidated and severed from § 1201 the potential for the imposition of the 
death penalty for kidnapping offenses.39  More specifically, the Court held 
that “[t]he statute sets forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty 
upon a defendant who waives the right to [a] jury trial or upon one who 
pleads guilty,”40 and the “inevitable effect of any such provision is, of 
course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead 
guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury 
trial.”41  The Court in Furman, on the other hand, cast doubt on the 
imposition of the death penalty for all crimes.  The Furman Court held that 
“the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”42  Congress responded to the Court in 1972 by 
passing the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests 
of the United States, which in part amended § 1201 to eliminate the 
possibility of a death sentence.43
The most recent and major change to § 1201 occurred in 1994, when 
Congress enacted a spate of tough-on-crime legislation, including the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.
 
44  This Act amended 
§ 1201 once again; it now provides that “if the death of any person results 
[from the kidnapping], [the perpetrator] shall be punished by death or life 
imprisonment.”45
 
35 United States v. McInnis, 601 F.2d 1319, 1323–24 (5th Cir. 1979). 
  The 1972 amendment taken together with the 1994 
amendment to § 1201 means the federal kidnapping offense was a non-
capital punishment eligible crime only from 1972 to 1994.  At all other 
points since the statute was created in 1932, a § 1201 conviction was a 
death-penalty eligible offense. 
36 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006). 
37 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
38 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
39 390 U.S. at 572. 
40 Id. at 571. 
41 Id. at 581 (citation omitted). 
42 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40.  Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme 
Court reopened the door for capital punishment in certain circumstances.  428 U.S. 153 
(1976). 
43 Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972). 
44 Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 60003(a)(6), § 1201, 108 Stat. 1796, 1969 (1994). 
45 Id. 
2011] PROSECUTIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS ERA CRIMES 705 
Section 1201 has never expressly contained its own statute of 
limitations period.  Instead, 18 U.S.C. § 3281, Capital Offenses,46 has 
always applied to § 1201, for determination of the appropriate statute of 
limitations for a kidnapping prosecution and other capital punishment 
eligible offenses.  Section 3281 provides that “[a]n indictment for any 
offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limitation.”47  
Thus, as long as § 1201 remained a capital punishment eligible offense, the 
combination of § 1201 and § 3281 provided an unlimited statute of 
limitations period.  Non-capital federal offenses are governed by § 3282, 
which provides, that “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law, no 
person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, 
unless the indictment is found . . . within five years. . . .”48
III. DISCUSSION 
  As a result, 
kidnapping crimes committed between 1972 and 1994 were subject only to 
a five-year statute of limitations period because the underlying offense was 
not eligible for the death penalty. 
The curious byproduct of Seale’s unique procedural history is that the 
only opinion of any length is Judge DeMoss’s original Fifth Circuit opinion 
that vacated Seale’s conviction.49  In fact, the per curiam en banc opinion of 
the Fifth Circuit affirming the district court’s denial of the statute of 
limitations motion is only two sentences.50
A. RETROACTIVITY OF THE 1972 AMENDMENT TO § 1201 
  Accordingly, subpart A of this 
Part begins by following the structure of the original Fifth Circuit opinion 
that vacated the conviction with an evaluation of whether the 1972 
amendment to § 1201 should be applied retroactively.  Subpart B departs 
from the original Fifth Circuit opinion to identify whether due process 
considerations should nullify a forty-three year delay in prosecution.  
Finally, subpart C considers the traditional justifications for enforcing a 
statute of limitations period and whether those justifications are relevant to 
the prosecution of a Civil Rights Era offender. 
As previously mentioned, Congress passed the Act for the Protection 
of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States in 1972, 
largely in response to the Court’s decisions in Jackson and Furman.51
 
46 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (2006).  Section 3281 has not changed significantly since 1964. 
  The 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at § 3282. 
49 United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033 (5th Cir. 2008). 
50 United States v. Seale, 570 F.3d 650, 650 (5th Cir. 2009). 
51 Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972). 
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original Fifth Circuit opinion started its analysis with a determination of 
whether the 1972 amendment to § 1201 should be applied retroactively to 
crimes committed prior to 1972,52
1. Legislative Intent 
 and this Comment will begin with that 
same determination.  The importance of determining whether the 1972 
amendment should be applied retroactively cannot be overstated since such 
an application could render Seale’s conviction and all subsequent Civil 
Rights Era convictions predicated upon § 1201 void.  Thus, this first 
subpart analyzes the various legislative interpretation tools a court might 
use to determine whether the 1972 amendment should apply retroactively, 
including (1) congressional intent in changing the capital nature of the 
kidnapping statute in 1972 and (2) the general policy against retroactivity.  
In the following analysis, it becomes clear that the amendment should not 
apply to crimes committed prior to 1972. 
The first interpretation tool a court might use in assessing the 
retroactivity of the 1972 amendment to § 1201 is legislative intent.53
It is first instructive to recall the original Fifth Circuit panel’s 
construction of the legislative intent of the 1972 amendment.  The original 
Fifth Circuit panel reviewed the House debate in the Congressional Record 
and noted that Representative Richard Poff, the author of the 1972 
amendment, stated that the death penalty provision was removed from the 
  In 
other words, the question is whether it was Congress’s intent to expressly 
change the statute of limitations period by eliminating the capital nature of 
§ 1201 offenses or was Congress simply concerned with complying with 
the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements in Furman and Jackson.  Only 
the former interpretation would permit the 1972 amendment to operate 
retroactively. 
 
52 Seale, 542 F.3d at 1036 (“[T]o determine whether an amendment to a statute should be 
given retroactive effect, we first look to the intent of Congress.”). 
53 There have been a significant number of criticisms leveled at the use of legislative 
intent as a statutory interpretation tool.  Justice Scalia has been the most vocal advocate for 
its elimination, as he favors a brand of new textualism that attempts to determine the original 
meaning of a statute.  See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  However, other Justices, including Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, have 
continued to use legislative intent as an interpretation tool.  See, e.g., Chisom, 501 U.S. at 
395–96; Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 516–21 (1989).  While it appears 
that Justice Scalia’s brand of new textualism was popular among his colleagues from his 
appointment in 1986 to 1995, “it remains important to research and brief the legislative 
history thoroughly.”  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
795 (4th ed. 2007).  
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bill as a response to Furman.54  Based on that statement, the court presumed 
that Congress was aware of the statute of limitations and thus, expressly 
finding that there was no legislative history to the contrary, the court 
inferred that Congress intended to change the limitations period.55  The 
panel, however, ignored Representative Poff’s more salient discussion 
regarding the elimination of the death penalty as a potential punishment.  
Representative Poff stated that the 1972 amendment should be construed as 
“nothing but a stopgap handling of the death penalty question,” and “[a] 
more lasting determination of how, and whether, the death penalty might be 
prescribed . . . is an important and complex matter in itself, and passage of 
this otherwise relatively noncontroversial measure should not await a 
permanent resolution of that issue.”56
It is undeniable that the change in the potential punishment for 
kidnappings in no way reflects a congressional desire to change the statute 
of limitations period.  Nothing in the Congressional Record suggests that it 
became easier to solve kidnappings or that the crime was any less deserving 
of an unlimited limitations period.  This is a very different type of 
legislative intent from what was suggested by the original Seale panel, and 
certainly different than a willful change to the statute of limitations.  The 
Fifth Circuit’s inference with respect to the limitations period is simply 
unsupported by the Congressional Record.  Alternatively, Representative 
Poff’s statement that the elimination of the death penalty as a stopgap 
measure more strongly supports an inference that Congress only intended to 
change the punishment to maintain the constitutionality of § 1201 offenses 
post-Furman. 
  Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s 
assertion, Representative Poff appeared willing to amend the death penalty 
component of § 1201 only as a means of maintaining the constitutionality 
of the entire statute. 
Another, albeit much less persuasive, piece of evidence from the 
Congressional Record evidencing congressional intent is the title of the 
bill—the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of 
the United States.57
 
54 United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1036 n.5 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 118 CONG. REC. 
27116 (1972)). 
  The bill’s title reflects the impetus for the bill, and the 
Congressional Record notes there has been a “disturbing increase of 
55 Id. at 1036–39. 
56 118 CONG. REC. 27116 (1972). 
57 In determining legislative intent, the title of a particular bill is probative at best and 
irrelevant at worst.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has reviewed the 
title of a bill in certain limited circumstances.  See, e.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 527–
28 (2002); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892). 
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violence directed against [foreign] diplomats.”58  Additionally, 
Representative Poff indicates that the “purpose of this legislation is to 
promote the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States by protecting 
the property and the personnel of foreign governments while they are 
present in this country.”59  The text of the bill itself is equally illustrative.  
For example, Section 2 states that “this legislation is intended to afford the 
United States jurisdiction . . . to proceed against those who . . . interfere 
with its conduct of foreign affairs.”60
While the title of a bill or its general purpose is by no means definitive 
evidence of congressional intent, it is at least helpful for our purposes to 
illustrate that Congress likely did not consider or intend the corresponding 
change to the statute of limitations period.  Even conceding that the 
Congressional Record is not a dispositive statutory interpretation tool, it is 
undeniable that the record does not permit an inference that Congress 
specifically intended to change the statute of limitations period. 
 
2. General Policy Against Retroactivity 
The second interpretation tool at a court’s disposal is the general 
policy against retroactivity, which has been described as “deeply rooted in 
[the Supreme Court’s] jurisprudence”61 and “a legal doctrine centuries older 
than our Republic.”62  One principal justification for the general anti-
retroactivity doctrine is the Court’s desire to create “a rule of law that gives 
people confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.”63  
Retroactive legislation unfairly upsets the ability of private actors to plan 
their behavior in accordance with federal law.64
While a general presumption against statutory retroactivity exists, the 
Court in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital provided a legislative 
escape hatch when it held that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law,” 
and as a result, “congressional enactments and administrative rules will not 





58 118 CONG. REC. 27113 (1972). 
  As the preceding analysis on legislative intent indicated, there 
was no support in the legislative history to the 1972 amendment to § 1201 
for the idea that Congress intended to have the change in punishment and 
59 Id. at 27116. 
60 Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, 
Pub. L. No. 92-539, 86 Stat. 1070, 1071 (1972). 
61 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 266. 
64 Id. 
65 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (emphasis added). 
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subsequent change in the statute of limitations apply retroactively.66
Despite what now appears to be the current policy against legislative 
retroactivity, some commentators depict the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
jurisprudence as having vacillated “between a flexible discretionary 
approach and a bright-line rule” for a period of time, especially as it 
grappled with its substantive due process jurisprudence at the turn of the 
century.
  Thus, 
the Bowen escape hatch does not apply to § 1201 prosecutions similar to 
Seale’s. 
67  In writing for the majority in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,68 
Justice Stevens sought to reconcile the doctrinal confusion.  Justice Stevens 
noted the disfavor with which the Court viewed legislative retroactivity69 
and created the following three scenarios (in addition to the clear intent rule 
discussed in Bowen) that would permit retroactive application of a new 
statute: (1) “the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of 
prospective relief[,]”70 (2) the intervening statute changes a court’s 
jurisdiction,71 or (3) the intervening statute changes the procedural rules.72  
Justice Stevens defended the exclusion of procedural changes from the 
retroactivity doctrine because private actors have “diminished reliance 
interests in matters of procedure,” and “rules of procedure regulate 
secondary rather than primary conduct.”73
The Fifth Circuit panel availed itself of the third Landgraf exception 
and construed the change in the statute of limitations period for kidnapping 
offenses as procedural in nature.
 
74  As a result, that Court held that 
Congress intended the 1972 amendment to apply retroactively.75  In so 
ruling, the panel provided a less-than-helpful definition of a procedural 
change: “statutes of limitations are procedural in nature because they do not 
disturb substantive rights.”76
 
66 Pub. L. No. 92-539, sec. 201, § 1201, 86 Stat. 1070, 1072 (1972). 
  A Florida district court provided a more 
helpful definition: “[a] substantive law creates, defines, and regulates rights 
67 Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1997). 
68 511 U.S. 244 (1994). 
69 Id. at 268. 
70 Id. at 273. 
71 Id. at 274. 
72 Id. at 275. 
73 Id. 
74 United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1036 (5th Cir. 2008). 
75 Id. at 1036–37. 
76 Id. at 1037. 
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as opposed to procedural or remedial law which prescribes a method of 
enforcing the rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.”77
In citing Landgraf, the original Fifth Circuit Seale panel ignored an 
important qualification espoused in Landgraf for applying procedural 
changes retroactively.  Justice Stevens wrote that “the mere fact that a new 
rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every pending case.”
 
78  
For example, Justice Stevens cited a 1990 amendment to the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure for the proposition that “amendments [are] 
applicable to pending cases insofar as they are ‘just and practicable.’”79
Given the legislative retroactivity doctrine adopted by Landgraf, two 
related questions remain with respect to Seale and other similarly situated 
Civil Rights Era prosecutions under § 1201.  The first question is whether a 
change in the applicable statute of limitations should be construed as 
procedural or substantive.  Second, if the statute of limitations is identified 
as procedural, it must be determined whether applying the 1972 amendment 
retroactively is just. 
  
Thus, identification of a legislative change as procedural creates a 
presumption that can be overcome by a showing of some manifest injustice 
or impracticability.  A showing of injustice by the prosecution in a case 
such as Seale’s would overcome the procedural/substantive distinction even 
if the change in statute of limitations period was construed as strictly 
procedural. 
a. Is a Change in the Statute of Limitations Period Procedural or 
Substantive in Nature? 
In Seale, the original Fifth Circuit panel ruled that the change in the 
statute of limitations period was procedural in nature.80  In reaching that 
conclusion, the court noted that “[c]riminal statutes of limitation merely 
limit the time in which the government can initiate a criminal charge and do 
not burden substantive rights.”81  The Fifth Circuit also relied in part on 
State v. Skakel, which held that an extension to a limitations period can be 
applied retroactively as long as the initial limitations period had not 
expired.82
 
77 Richardson v. Honda Motor Co., 686 F. Supp. 303, 304 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (citation 
omitted). 
  The Skakel court is not alone in holding that the limitations 
period is a procedural component of a statute.  In fact, the Skakel court cites 
78 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 n.29. 
79 Id. (quoting Order Amending Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 495 U.S. 969 
(1990)). 
80 Seale, 542 F.3d at 1036–37. 
81 Id. at 1037. 
82 Id. at 1038 (quoting State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1022 (Conn. 2006)). 
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a total of twenty-one state law cases suggesting that a change in the 
limitations period should apply retroactively, while citing five cases that 
held such a change should be applied only prospectively.83  Nevertheless, 
the original Fifth Circuit panel erred by construing the 1972 amendment as 
procedural, and thus retroactive, since its ruling (1) is not consistent with 
Landgraf, (2) ignores the effect of a reduced statute of limitations as 
described in the Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Central School District84
First, the 1972 amendment to § 1201 appears to be similar to the 
congressional action that the Supreme Court confronted in Landgraf.  The 
issue presented in Landgraf was whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 should be applied retroactively to a plaintiff that was demanding a 
jury trial.
 
concurring opinion, and (3) ignores the more basic distinctions between 
substantive and procedural changes. 
85  Prior to the 1991 Act, the Civil Rights Act only provided for 
equitable remedies.86  One principal change in the 1991 Act was the 
provision providing that a plaintiff seeking compensatory or punitive 
damages could demand a jury trial.87  The plaintiff in Landgraf experienced 
workplace discrimination prior to the enactment of the 1991 Act.88  Because 
of the change in available remedies, the plaintiff sought to avail herself of 
the new provisions with respect to a jury trial.89  The Landgraf Court, 
however, held that the statute could not be applied retroactively because the 
statute was substantive in nature.90
The statutory change in damages available in Landgraf appears 
remarkably similar to the statutory change in the punishment available to 
prosecutors for a § 1201 conviction.  Both statutory amendments changed 
the available remedies, which had a secondary effect on a substantive right.  
If Landgraf is our guide for determining whether a statutory change is 
procedural or substantive, then the 1972 amendment falls on the substantive 
side of the discussion. 
 
A second concern with the Fifth Circuit’s view that the statute of 
limitations change affected simple procedural rights was its failure to take 
account of a principal difference between Skakel and Seale.  The twenty-
one cases that Skakel cites to support its holding are predicated on statutory 
 
83 Skakel, 888 A.2d at 1024–25. 
84 49 F.3d 886, 891–92 (2d Cir. 1995). 
85 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 247 (1994). 
86 Id. at 252. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 887–88. 
89 Id. at 249. 
90 Id. at 281 (finding “a jury trial [is] available only ‘[i]f a complaining party seeks 
compensatory or punitive damages’”). 
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amendments that extended the statute of limitations period while the initial 
limitations period was still valid.91  Those cases do not account for what 
should happen when the limitations period is shortened.  This is exactly the 
scenario that the concurring opinion worried about in Vernon v. Cassadaga 
Valley Central School District, a case cited by the Fifth Circuit in Seale.92  
The issue presented to the court in Vernon was how to apply a 1991 
amendment that changed the statute of limitations period for civil suits 
brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).93  
After noting a split among other circuit courts as to the retroactivity of the 
1991 amendment, a two-judge majority ruled that a statutory change to the 
statute of limitations for ADEA civil actions should be applied 
retroactively.94
Judge Cabranes’s concurrence in Vernon is most relevant to this 
Comment.  Judge Cabranes suggested that there is an inherent difficulty in 
defining a statute of limitations change as procedural or substantive, noting 
that such a change “lie[s] on the cusp of the procedural/substantive 
distinction.”
 
95  More importantly, Judge Cabranes presciently worried about 
statutory changes that shorten the statute of limitations period, which is 
precisely the type of statutory change affecting § 1201 prosecutions.96  
Judge Cabranes stated that in a civil context, “absent a clear statement from 
Congress, the new, shorter period should not be applied to plaintiffs who 
never had a chance to comply with the new rule.”97  Ultimately, the 
concurrence found little use in labeling a change in the statute of limitations 
as procedural or substantive given the amorphous nature of such a 
distinction.98  To illustrate his point, Judge Cabranes noted that the 
limitations period was “treated as ‘procedural’ for choice-of-law purposes 
in context of [the] Full Faith and Credit Clause,”99 while at the same time it 
was treated as substantive “for Erie doctrine purposes.”100
 
91 State v. Skakel, 888 A.2d 985, 1024–25 (Conn. 2006). 
  Instead, Judge 
Cabranes favored reviewing the statutory change in the context of the larger 
92 United States v. Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1037 n.6 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Vernon v. 
Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 49 F.3d 886, 889 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
93 Vernon, 49 F.3d at 889. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 892 (Cabranes, J., concurring); see also United States v. Blue Sea Line, 553 F.2d 
445, 448 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that “the distinction between procedure and substance tends 
to confuse more than clarify”).  Notably, the original Fifth Circuit Seale opinion cited this 
exact language.  Seale, 542 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 2008). 
96 Vernon, 49 F.3d at 891 (Cabranes., J., concurring). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 892. 
100 Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–29 (1988)). 
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legislative scheme.101
Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis oversimplified the distinction 
between procedural and substantive statutory changes, as the court was 
mistaken in asserting that a change in the statute of limitations does not 
affect substantive rights.  To the contrary, a statute of limitations change 
affects at least three parties’ substantive rights.  First, a change to the 
limitations period can determine whether or not a defendant faces criminal 
charges.  It seems obvious that compelling an individual to stand trial and 
face the potential for a state-imposed punishment clearly changes that 
person’s substantive rights—jail time is a prima facie example of a 
reduction in liberty, which is a substantive right.  Additionally, an offender 
who faced an initial limitations period of two years at the time of the 
offense and subsequently faced a five-year limitations period as a result of a 
legislative change has clearly had his substantive rights affected.  The fact 
that Seale faced a reduced limitations period after the 1972 amendment 
does not mean his substantive rights were any less affected. 
  Thus, while the Fifth Circuit is accurate in 
highlighting cases that conclude a change in a limitations period is 
procedural, it is simply incorrect to ignore the effects of lengthening versus 
shortening the limitations period. 
The individual standing trial is not the only party whose substantive 
rights are affected by a change in the statute of limitations.  The government 
has a substantive interest in ensuring justice in incarcerating criminals to 
prevent them from committing subsequent offenses.  Additionally, the 
family members of the victims have substantive interests in seeing justice 
come to bear on those responsible for the deaths of their relatives.102
b. Is a Retroactive Application of the 1972 Amendment Just? 
  Given 
the potential effect on the substantive rights of these three parties, it is 
disingenuous to suggest that a change in the limitations period is nothing 
more than procedural. 
Recall Judge Cabranes’s desire to review statutory changes in the 
context of the broader legislative scheme103 and Justice Stevens’s desire to 
review the statutory change for injustice.104
 
101 Id. (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 557–58 (1974)). 
  Both reviews eschew the 
strictures of a bright-line retroactivity rule in favor of a rule that ensures 
injustice does not result from a retroactive application of a statute.  The 
preceding distinction between procedural and substantive rights is therefore 
irrelevant if the statutory change in question would create injustice for one 
102 See infra text accompanying note 107. 
103 Vernon, 49 F.3d at 892 (Cabranes, J., concurring). 
104 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 275 n.29 (1994). 
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or more of the parties.  This subsection evaluates whether a retroactive 
application of § 1201 is just. 
Most justifications for the retroactivity doctrine begin with the 
assertion that the law should give fair notice to private actors so they may 
be able to order their primary behavior.105  However, this concern for fair 
notice and private planning is not present in Seale’s case.  Seale had the 
opportunity to inform himself of the intricacies of the 1964 version of 
§ 1201 to the extent he was interested, and he had his opportunity to order 
his affairs in conformance with the 1964 law.  Instead, Seale and his co-
conspirators willfully chose to violate the kidnapping provisions as enacted 
at the time of the murder.  There is simply no evidence that Seale faced 
injustice during his 2007 prosecution since he had adequate notice via the 
1964 version of § 1201 that provided for an unlimited statute of limitations 
for kidnappings that resulted in harm to the victim.106
On the other hand, the victims’ families and the government might 
argue that they independently had a reasonable interest in the 1964 version 
of § 1201.  Victims and their family members have a significant stake in the 
outcome of a criminal trial, and it would be foolish to ignore their collective 
interest in justice.  For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Payne v. 
Tennessee that “the assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result 
of the crime charged has understandably been an important concern of the 
criminal law . . . .”
  There is no reason to 
give him the benefit of a subsequent statutory change based on the belief 
that he was unable to properly order his affairs. 
107
In the end, it is clear that statutory interpretation tools do not support a 
retroactive application of the 1972 amendment to § 1201.  First, a review of 
the legislative history of the 1972 bill reveals a complete absence of intent 
to change the limitations period as opposed to simply changing the 
punishment.  Similarly, Congress’s textual silence as to the amendment’s 
general retroactivity prevents the retroactivity doctrine’s escape hatch from 
being employed.  Next, notwithstanding Congress’s silence, a change to the 
  As a result, if any party had a reliance interest in the 
kidnapping law, it was the prosecution and the victims’ families.  
Ultimately, the absence of injustice against Seale and the manifest injustice 
the victims’ families would dictate that the 1972 amendment to § 1201 
should only be applied prospectively. 
 
105 Id. at 265. 
106 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964) (amended 2006). 
107 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991).  Payne expressly permitted the use of victim impact 
statements in certain circumstances and in the process overruled both South Carolina v. 
Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).  The propriety 
of Payne is well beyond the confines of this Comment.  It is cited herein simply to suggest 
that courts can and do consider victims’ interests. 
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statute of limitations period should be construed as a change to a 
substantive right, which limits a court’s ability to apply the limitations 
period retroactively.  Finally, a court should not apply the amendment 
retroactively due to the potential of injustice to the prosecution and the 
victims’ families.  Because a retroactive application of the 1972 amendment 
is improper, prosecution against Seale and other § 1201 defendants should 
proceed under the pre-1972 version of the statute. 
B. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
To the extent that the 1972 amendment to § 1201 is not applied 
retroactively, the next question to consider with respect to Seale and 
similarly situated Civil Rights Era prosecutions based on § 1201 is whether 
a significant (forty-three years for Seale) delay in bringing charges against a 
potential defendant violates the due process rights of that defendant.  The 
Supreme Court in United States v. Lovasco held that “the Due Process 
Clause does not permit courts to abort criminal prosecutions simply because 
they disagree with a prosecutor’s judgment as to when to seek an 
indictment.”108  Furthermore, the Court held that “[j]udges are not free . . . 
to impose on law enforcement officials our ‘personal and private notions’ of 
fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial 
function.’”109
Seale is not the first Civil Rights Era prosecution that has faced an 
appreciable amount of time between the alleged crime and the indictment.  
To name just a few others, Ernest Avants was convicted for his role in the 
death of Ben Chester White; Edgar Ray Killen was convicted for his role in 
the death of three civil rights workers in 1964; and Bobby Frank Cherry 
was convicted for his role in the deaths of four young girls killed in a 
Birmingham church bombing.
  In response to this due process consideration, this subpart 
will review other recent Civil Rights Era prosecutions to determine whether 
such a pre-indictment delay abridges the procedural due process rights of 
the defendant. 
110  While no Seale opinion addressed the due 
process question, another recent Civil Rights Era prosecution, Killen v. 
State, did.111  In reviewing due process considerations associated with the 
delay in prosecution, the court in Killen applied a two-prong test developed 
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Marion.112
 
108 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977). 
  The Marion test asks 
109 Id. 
110 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
111 958 So. 2d 172, 189–91 (Miss. 2007).  While Killen is a state prosecution and Seale is 
a federal prosecution, similar procedural due process issues existed given the prosecutorial 
delay present in both cases. 
112 Id. at 189. 
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the following two questions in determining whether a pre-indictment delay 
violated the defendant’s due process rights: (1) did the pre-indictment delay 
cause actual prejudice, and (2) was the pretrial delay used intentionally by 
the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage?113  Although the Marion test 
allows a defendant to make a due process argument with respect to pre-
indictment delays, the argument is rarely successful because the defendant 
bears a heavy burden in proving that the delay offended due process.114
1. Actual Prejudice 
  
Nevertheless, the following analysis will evaluate the components of the 
Marion test individually as it relates to § 1201 prosecutions. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court recently applied the Marion test in 
Killen v. State.115  Edgar Ray Killen was originally acquitted in 1967 of 
federal charges that alleged he “conspire[d] to violate the civil rights” of 
three Mississippi Freedom Summer civil rights workers that were killed in 
1964.116  Forty-one years after the murders, Killen was charged and 
convicted in state court on three counts of manslaughter.117  In affirming 
Killen’s conviction, the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the two-prong 
Marion test to determine whether the delay in charges resulted in a 
violation of Killen’s procedural due process rights.118  In doing so, the 
Court first held that the defendant’s old age, his failing health, and the 
inability of a court to find a jury of his peers (Killen argued that a jury of 
his peers was not available since “they had long passed away or were too 
old to serve on juries”) did not constitute actual prejudice.119  Killen also 
argued that faded memories and the potential lack of cross-examination of 
key witnesses also created actual prejudice.120  In ruling against Killen’s 
faded memories argument, the Killen court relied on De La Beckwith v. 
State, in which the Mississippi Supreme Court held that “[v]ague assertions 
of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient 
to establish a due process violation from preindictment delay.”121
 
113 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). 
  Thus, 
114 See Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that “the 
Constitution places a very heavy burden on a defendant to show that [the] pre-indictment 
delay has offended due process”); see also Killen, 958 So. 2d at 191. 
115 Killen, 958 So. 2d at 188–91. 
116 Id. at 173. 
117 Id. at 173–74. 
118 Id. at 189. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 190. 
121 De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 570 (Miss. 1997) (citing United States v. 
Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
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Seale or another § 1201 defendant will likely be unsuccessful in making 
general assertions about lost witnesses and evidence, in addition to being 
unsuccessful with respect to a claim about the defendant’s health, age, or 
the lack of a jury of his peers. 
One question the Killen and De La Beckwith Courts left open is 
whether a previous trial is necessary to obviate the due process inquiry.  For 
example, the Killen and De La Beckwith courts allowed both the 
prosecution and defense to use testimony and evidence from the original 
proceedings to the extent that a witness had died prior to the most recent 
trial.  In fact, six of the state’s fourteen witnesses in Killen were called by 
transcript from the previous trial.122
As mentioned, no Seale opinion addressed whether the forty-three year 
indictment delay for Seale resulted in an abridgement of his procedural due 
process rights.  We are left to rely on other courts’ rulings to determine 
whether Seale or any other similarly situated § 1201 defendant faced an 
abridgment of their due process rights.  To begin, Killen seems to stand for 
the proposition that age, health, and juries consisting of “non-peers” are 
non-starters, and that type of argument clearly would not help Seale prove a 
violation of his due process rights. 
 
A key difference between Seale on the one hand and Killen and De La 
Beckwith on the other, however, is that Seale never faced trial at some 
earlier point in time.  The absence of an original trial might allow Seale to 
construct a stronger argument that his due process rights were violated since 
he cannot avail himself of evidence from a 1960s trial.  However, Seale and 
his co-conspirator Charles Marcus Edwards had both allegedly confessed to 
certain aspects of the murders after their initial arrest in November 1964123 
and presumably faced certain pretrial procedures before their charges were 
dropped.  Such procedures might lessen the actual bias against Seale.  
Furthermore, Seale has the potential to discover documents detailing why 
his charges were originally dropped; reliable (albeit old) evidence is still 
available to both the prosecution and Seale.124
 
122 Killen, 958 So. 2d at 190. 
  Neither the prosecution nor 
the defense has to rely entirely on the potential for failed memories since 
both sides can use evidence that had been previously memorialized in one 
form or another.  Thus, while a transcript from trial was not available for 
Seale’s prosecution, other documents including his confession and other 
pretrial procedures were available to both sides, which drastically lessens 
any potential actual prejudice. 
123 MACLEAN, supra note 8, at 38–39; see also Ladd, supra note 11. 
124 Dewan, supra note 6, at A11. 
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Ultimately, and to the extent that Seale and other similarly situated 
§ 1201 defendants attempt to argue that their lack of an initial trial presents 
actual bias, Killen suggests that their arguments must be more than simple 
“[v]ague assertions” of actual prejudice, which might include the death of a 
key witness or some other specific assertion regarding the spoliation of key 
evidence.125
2. Intentional Delay 
  Failing any specific allegation of bias, it is unlikely that Seale 
or any other § 1201 defendant will be able to prove the existence of actual 
prejudice, especially since their original statements to investigators in 1964 
and other pretrial procedural evidence could be used during the 
contemporary trial. 
Even to the extent that Seale or some other § 1201 defendant is able to 
prove actual prejudice, that defendant is also required to prove that there 
was an intentional delay on the part of the prosecution to gain some tactical 
advantage during trial.126  One court interpreted the second prong of the 
Marion test to mean that pre-indictment delay could not be used to harass 
the defendant.127  Yet another court has interpreted Marion’s second prong 
to mean that the prosecution must actually intend to gain a tactical 
advantage via the pre-indictment delay and that simple negligence will not 
suffice.128
In Killen, the court was not forced to address the merits of an 
intentional delay claim since actual prejudice did not exist.
 
129  Nevertheless, 
it acknowledged the existence of Killen’s tactical advantage argument 
before quickly dismissing it.  Killen argued that the state gained a tactical 
advantage because the nature of jury duty and the type of jurors selected for 
jury duty materially changed from the 1960s to his prosecution in 2005.130  
Killen’s brief stated, “It would be foolish to argue that the attitude of the 
general public has not changed from the sixties all to the advantage of the 
State and to actual prejudice against [Killen].”131  The Mississippi Supreme 
Court noted that Killen’s assertion was probably accurate, but there was no 
legal precedent for such an assertion and the claim simply lacked merit.132
 
125 Killen, 958 So. 2d at 190. 
  
One might expect for Seale and other § 1201 defendants to make similar 
126 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). 
127 United States v. McMullin, 511 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978 (N.D. Iowa 2007).  
128 Clark v. State, 774 A.2d 1136, 1152–53 (Md. 2001). 
129 Killen, 958 So. 2d at 190–91. 
130 Id. at 191. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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arguments, but Killen appears to foreclose the possibility that such an 
assertion might succeed. 
A second type of intentional delay argument was foreclosed in United 
States v. Eisbart.133  The court in Eisbart held that an allegation “that 
evidence sufficient to indict was available to the Government well in 
advance” of the indictment is not adequate to support an allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct.134  This ruling appears to be consistent with a 
Maryland Court of Appeals ruling that stated that simple negligence is not 
enough to prove the prosecution gained a tactical advantage.135
Ultimately, Seale is unlikely to prove that the pre-indictment delay 
caused him any actual prejudice.  Even if Seale is able to prove some 
modicum of actual prejudice, he must also satisfy the second prong of 
Marion, which requires a showing that the prosecution was more than 




C. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NOT APPLYING THE 1972 
AMENDMENT RETROACTIVELY 
  As a result, any argument Seale makes with respect to his due 
process rights is likely to fail given the steep burden imposed on defendants 
in proving a due process violation. 
The final question to consider in analyzing Seale’s conviction and 
similar § 1201 prosecutions is whether an application of the 1972 
amendment to § 1201 is normatively fair to both the prosecution and the 
defendant.  This subpart will begin by discussing the traditional 
justifications associated with statute of limitations provisions and the 
contemporary changes Congress has made to those traditional notions and 
assumptions.  This subpart will then address the balance between not 
applying the 1972 amendment and the traditional rationales offered in 
support of limitations periods.  Ultimately, this subpart will conclude from a 
normative point of view that the 1972 amendment should not apply 
retroactively to § 1201 prosecutions for Civil Rights Era offenses. 
1. Traditional Justifications and Contemporary Changes to Statute of 
Limitations Periods 
The first step in assessing whether Seale’s prosecution is normatively 
fair is to briefly recall the generally recited benefits and justifications of a 
 
133 No. 83 Cr. 806–CSH, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17498, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 
1984). 
134 Id. 
135 Clark v. State, 774 A.2d 1136, 1152–53 (Md. 2001). 
136 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971). 
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well-defined statute of limitations period.137  The first and perhaps most 
obvious justification is that “after a certain time, no quantum of evidence is 
sufficient to convict” a defendant.138  Witnesses’ memories fade and “[f]or 
this reason, it will be more difficult . . . to defend . . . against charges 
relating to 10-year-old events than 1-week-old events.”139  A second 
identified justification for a statute of limitations period is Congress’s long-
held policy favoring repose.140  The Supreme Court has held that “statutes 
of limitation are to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose.”141  A policy 
favoring repose is one that promotes putting an old crime to rest for the 
benefit of the accused and for the benefit of society.142  The accused and the 
prosecution can feel a sense of relief knowing that they no longer must be 
concerned with an offense committed many years ago.  The third traditional 
justification for statute of limitations periods asserts that such a period may 
encourage “law enforcement officials [to] promptly investigate suspected 
criminal activity,”143 which in effect promotes adjudicatory efficiency 
benefiting both the criminal justice system and the accused.144  Finally, 
statutes of limitations “provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond 
which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial would be prejudiced.”145  Similar to the third justification, the 
predictability justification is often asserted by those in favor of judicial 
efficiency.146
Despite what appears to be the criminal justice system’s general policy 
towards strictly construing statute of limitations periods, state legislatures 
and Congress have been moving to lengthen statute of limitations periods 
for many types of criminal offenses.  In fact, there have been at least twelve 
new exceptions carved out for the federal limitations period in the last 
  Taken together and bearing in mind the Court’s longstanding 
deference to repose, strict and perhaps traditional enforcement of statutory 
limitations periods might favor non-prosecution in matters similar to 
Seale’s. 
 
137 See, e.g., Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 115, 129–31 (2008) (identifying the traditional rationales for statute of limitations 
periods). 
138 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 615 (2003). 
139 DANIEL W. SHUMAN & ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE PROSECUTION 
OF OLD CRIMES: BALANCING LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND MORAL CONCERNS 61 (2000). 
140 Marion, 404 U.S. at 322; see also Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 215–16 
(1953). 
141 Marion, 404 U.S. at 322 n.14. 
142 Id. 
143 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970). 
144 Powell, supra note 137, at 130–31. 
145 Marion, 404 U.S. at 322. 
146 Powell, supra note 137, at 131. 
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twenty years.147  For example, Congress abolished the statute of limitations 
for “terrorist offense[s] that ‘resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, 
death or serious bodily injury to another person.’”148  Likewise, the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s prompted Congress to lengthen the limitations 
period from five years to seven years for a “criminal offense of major 
procurement fraud committed against the United States.”149  There have 
also been limitations extensions for criminal offenses against children, 
trafficking offenses, and certain sexual offenses.150  Finally, and in addition 
to the extension of limitations periods for particular types of criminal 
activity, Congress has also extended the limitations periods for highly 
complex crimes and crimes that may require significant discovery.151
Given the numerous changes to limitations periods, the traditional 
justifications for a statute of limitations are less persuasive.  At least one 
commentator noted that “Congress had done very little to justify recent 
changes to the [limitations] rule[s] in relation to new circumstances or 
understandings, and a closer look at the exceptions’ likely effect suggests 
that they will undermine the interests and objectives that they have long 
been thought to protect.”
 
152
2. Normative Balance Between the 1972 Amendment and the Traditional 
Justifications for Statutes of Limitations 
  Thus, erosion of the traditional limitations 
periods for certain types of offenses also serves the purpose of eroding the 
traditional rationales offered for limitations periods in the first place.  Given 
these changes, strict construction of a limitations period against Seale and 
other similar defendants may no longer be warranted.  Given the conflicting 
signals pertaining to the justifications given for a statute of limitations 
period, it is perhaps best settled by an analysis of the normative 
considerations for not applying the 1972 amendment retroactively. 
Having introduced the justifications and recent legislative history of 
limitations periods, it is next important to determine whether those 
traditional justifications for a statute of limitations period (notwithstanding 
the contemporary changes nullifying many of those justifications) can be 
balanced with the norms of fairness and justice.  In fact, the first normative 
rebuttal to the traditional justification examines the general assumptions 
 
147 Id. at 124. 
148 Act of Oct. 26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title VII, § 809(a), 115 Stat. 379 (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3286 (2006); Powell, supra note 137, at 124. 
149 Powell, supra note 137, at 124; see Major Fraud Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 1031(f) 
(2006). 
150 Powell, supra note 137, at 125 & nn.66–70. 
151 18 U.S.C. § 3294 (2006); Powell, supra note 137, at 125–26. 
152 Powell, supra note 137, at 131–32. 
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about evidence in applying a limitations period in the first place.  As was 
previously asserted, “evidence is, by its nature, fragile and susceptible to 
destruction over time, as memories fade and witnesses die or become 
otherwise unavailable,”153 and there is evidence to suggest that even the 
most heinous and thus, most memorable, offenses are subject to the same 
deteriorating memories as other offenses.154  It is important to note, 
however, that evidence spoliation typically has a disproportionate effect on 
the prosecution rather than the defense since the state is charged with 
meeting the reasonable doubt standard.155  In fact, “[d]efense lawyers have 
often used delay [during the initial proceedings] to their [clients’] 
advantage.”156
In addition to the questionable assumption regarding the evidentiary 
burden defendants carry in old prosecutions, there is also a question about 
the quality of evidence brought to bear in an old prosecution.  As just noted, 
prosecutions of old crimes create the potential for failed memories and lost 
documents.  However, at least one court was satisfied with the ability of 
witnesses to recall specific events that occurred forty-one years earlier.
 
157  
Furthermore, a brief psychological analysis of memory suggests that 
memories of old crimes can still accurately reproduce details of the offense 
in certain circumstances.158
DNA analysis and other scientific advances in the collection of 
evidence may also bridge the divide between failed memories and 
contemporary prosecutions.  Some commentators suggest that “[g]iven 
these advances, the need for limitation periods has diminished.”
 
159  On the 
other hand, the imposition of scientific methods such as DNA testing seems 
to at least anecdotally create a presumption of guilt against the defendant.160
 
153 Thigpen v. Smith, 792 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th Cir. 1986). 
  
While the purported accuracy rates of DNA evidence remain high, it is 
worth noting that forensic scientists are also “fallible and sometimes blind 
154 SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 139, at 88–91. 
155 Id. at 88 (arguing that “because the state bears the burden of proving the elements of 
the crime charged . . . the unavailability of evidence ordinarily has a disproportionate impact 
on the prosecution”). 
156 Id. 
157 Killen v. State, 958 So. 2d 172, 190 (Miss. 2007) (finding “Killen’s other witnesses 
similarly had no problems recalling the events that took place in 1964”). 
158 SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 139, at 97 (“[Reliance] on inherently perishable proof 
in the prosecution of [old] crimes does not mean that justice cannot be done.  Instead, it 
means that we must proceed with great care.”). 
159 PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL 
LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 58 (2006). 
160 Powell, supra note 137, at 133. 
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to their own shortcomings.”161
The second normative rebuttal to the traditional justifications examines 
the benefits of repose.  Repose has long been identified as a justification 
based on the theory that “[t]he passage of time may . . . lead to profound 
changes in . . . identity.”
  While there was no suggestion with respect 
to the existence of DNA evidence that linked Seale to the deaths of Moore 
and Dee in any Seale opinion, the fact that these scientific methods exist 
pokes a hole in the infallibility of the statute of limitations justification 
regarding evidence spoliation. 
162  Additionally, more recent arguments for repose 
have focused on society’s interest in forgiving the wrongs of the past.163  
Nevertheless, the latter argument in a case such as Seale’s would create 
injustice to the family members of the two murder victims.164  For example, 
anecdotal evidence from victims’ families suggests the existence of a 
therapeutic value associated with a conviction.165  More specifically, some 
commentators suggest that the victims’ confrontation of the past wrong 
“may reasonably achieve the objective of helping the victim understand 
where he or she stands in relation to the offense.”166  It may also “relieve 
the victim of feelings of guilt,” and free the victim from continued fear.167  
While this normative rebuttal to the traditional justifications is 
psychological, there is no reason to dismiss it as unimportant.  In fact, many 
courts seem to appreciate the value associated with victims’ feelings as they 
permit victim impact statements to be read during the sentencing phase of a 
trial 168
Finally, the third normative rebuttal to the traditional statute of 
limitations justifications examines the existence of often blatant 
prosecutorial misconduct in many Civil Rights Era crimes that resulted in 
unprosecuted crimes such as those committed by Seale and De La 
Beckwith.  This prosecutorial misconduct is in complete contrast to the 
  
 
161 Scott Bales, Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, 26 NO. 2 LITIG. 51, 
58 (2000). 
162 Powell, supra note 137, at 130 (quoting SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 139, at 19). 
163 SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 139, at 12. 
164 It is at least noteworthy that the repose justification is ignored for crimes that 
Congress has deemed sufficiently heinous to warrant an unlimited statute of limitations.  See 
supra text at notes 147–48 (discussing the unlimited statute of limitations for some terrorism 
offenses). 
165 SHUMAN & SMITH, supra note 139, at 112. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991).  But see, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, 
Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L. REV. 
517 (2000) (arguing that courts should prohibit sentencing opinions in capital trials because 
they are prejudicial). 
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traditional justification that argues that limitations periods promote prompt 
investigations.  As was previously noted, the perfunctory investigation of 
Seale and Edwards in late 1964 and the speed with which the charges were 
dropped suggest that neither man would have ever been convicted in a 
1960s courtroom, even with overwhelming evidence proving their guilt.169  
Furthermore, one news account recounting the 1964 dismissal suggested 
that Seale and Edwards began spreading rumors that they were mistreated 
by the police during and after their arrest.170  The prosecutor acknowledged 
that the evidence against Seale and Edwards was strong, but ultimately 
dismissed the case since he was sure a grand jury would not bring an 
indictment if there was even a slight intimation that the men were beaten by 
the police.171
Ultimately, the normative justifications for refusing to apply the 1972 
amendment to § 1201 are strong and include the diminishing presumption 
that evidence is easily spoiled, a reluctance to create injustice towards the 
victims’ families, and a reluctance to perpetuate the prosecutorial 
misconduct of the era.  While these justifications certainly apply to § 1201 
prosecutions, some commentators advocate an even more sweeping 
change.
  Applying the 1972 amendment retroactively would therefore 
allow for the perverse result of almost condoning the actions of state-
sponsored racism by local and federal prosecutors, contravening the 
investigatory efficiency justification for a limitations period.  Therefore, the 
final normative rebuttal for not applying the 1972 amendment to § 1201 is 
to limit the protections that were given to wrongdoers by a corrupt and 
racist criminal justice system. 
172  Robinson and Cahill suggest that “statutes of limitation no 
longer serve a legitimate purpose, at least for serious offenses, but they 
continue to cause failures of justice and should therefore be abolished or 
greatly curtailed.”173
 
169 See MACLEAN, supra note 
  While this last assertion concerning the continued 
viability of limitations periods is outside the scope of this Comment, it is at 
a minimum suggestive that the traditional justifications for a limitations 
period seem to be less relevant for purposes of Civil Rights Era offenses 
such as James Ford Seale’s. 
8, at 37–38.  Additionally, Byron De La Beckwith was 
tried twice in 1964 and was twice acquitted by an all white jury before eventually being 
convicted in 1994, which lends credence to the assertion that Seale and other similar 
defendants would never have been convicted of their crimes during the Civil Rights era.  
Claudia Dreifus, The Widow Gets Her Verdict, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 27, 1994, at SM69. 
170 Ladd, supra note 11. 
171 Id. 
172 ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 159, at 60. 
173 Id. 
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IV. THE FUTURE OF CIVIL RIGHTS ERA PROSECUTIONS 
The effects of the Civil Rights Era still reverberate throughout the 
South.  Those effects include the question of how to proceed and whether to 
prosecute heinous, racially motivated crimes that were committed over forty 
years ago.  In fact, the FBI has identified approximately ninety-five 
“unsolved hate crimes from the Civil Rights Era” that are under active 
investigation.174  Furthermore, in 2008, Congress passed and President 
Bush signed the “Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act,”175 which 
allocated $135 million to the Department of Justice and the assignment of 
permanent Department of Justice personnel to the continuing investigation 
of open civil rights crimes committed before 1969.176
In assessing whether the 1972 amendment should apply retroactively, 
this Comment began by analyzing two tools of statutory interpretation.  
Most importantly, the general rule against retroactivity suggests that the 
1972 amendment should not apply retroactively to crimes committed prior 
to 1972.  Moreover, even to the extent that a court would construe a change 
to the statute of limitations as procedural, a court could not ignore the 
potential injustice created in not prosecuting a crime such as Seale’s.  
Additionally, and notwithstanding the unlimited statute of limitations 
period, a potential for due process abuse towards the defendant exists.  
However, the burden placed on the defendant in proving such a violation 
includes both actual prejudice and intent on behalf of the government to 
obtain a tactical advantage.  Again, to the extent Seale or a similarly 
situated defendant could prove actual prejudice, there is little hope in that 
defendant proving actual intent on the part of the government to gain a 
tactical advantage.  Finally, the normative rebuttals to the traditional 
justifications for not applying the 1972 amendment retroactively are a 
compelling reason to proceed with a prosecution. 
  While the amount of 
money allocated to solving old crimes is modest, this bill illustrates the 
government’s and perhaps the country’s continued desire to prosecute these 
crimes.  Therefore, determining whether the 1972 amendment to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1201 should apply retroactively has important ramifications for these 
future Civil Rights Era and perhaps even future organized crime 
prosecutions. 
Civil Rights Era crimes have the potential to remain a part of the fabric 
of this country as long as there are open cases that have gone unprosecuted.  
 
174 Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Combating Hate Crimes (Nov. 7, 2008), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/podcasts/inside/combating-hate-crimes/view.  
175 Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-344, 122 
Stat. 3934 (2008). 
176 Id. 
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To the extent that these crimes implicate 18 U.S.C. § 1201, courts have the 
tools to confront these crimes head-on.  Ultimately, the Department of 
Justice should continue prosecuting these crimes in an effort to bring 
closure to a sad chapter in this country’s history. 
